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I. INTRODUCTION 
Large companies have the power to craft agreements and trans-
actions in their favor through the use of form contracts, often called 
contracts of adhesion.  With the rise of the doctrine of unconscion-
ability,1 courts began to strike shockingly unfair terms out of form 
contracts.  Large companies, however, can avoid this result by using 
choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses.  One of the distinguishing 
features of our federalist system of government is that states are free 
to adopt and apply their own laws so long as those laws do not inter-
fere with federal law.2  One drawback to this system is that it creates 
an incentive for pre-dispute forum shopping.  This is especially prob-
lematic in the context of consumer contracts, since the company can 
invoke the favorable law of any chosen state by injecting a choice-of-
law or forum selection clause into an adhesion contract.  This prac-
tice could bind the party with less bargaining power to the law of a 
state with which they have no connection, and more importantly, the 
law of the chosen state could bar all of the party’s claims.3  Although 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2009, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2006, The 
University of Scranton.  I would like to thank Professor Ahmed Bulbulia for his guid-
ance and advice regarding this Comment.  Additionally, many thanks to Sean Mul-
ryne, John Roberts, and Matthew Gautier for invaluable stylistic advice and editing 
assistance. 
 1 See infra Part II.D. 
 2 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 3–4 (3d ed. 
2006). 
 3 See, e.g., Order, Scheifley v. Discover Bank, No. CV 03-2801 RBL (W.D. Wash. 
June 25, 2004) (plaintiff’s claims were barred because the court upheld the choice-
of-law clause, and the chosen state’s law allowed class-action waivers embedded with-
in arbitration clauses); Nexen Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g Co., 224 S.W.3d 412, 417 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (plaintiff’s claims barred because application of Alberta law 
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one of the primary purposes of adopting a conflict of laws regime was 
to curb pre-dispute forum shopping,4 the current conflicts system ac-
tually encourages forum shopping by giving great deference to the 
parties’ contractual choice-of-law or choice-of-forum clauses.5 
The egregiously unfair effects of the current system are felt most 
by consumers, individuals, and small businesses,6 who are generally 
the weaker party to the adhesion contract and have little or no bar-
gaining power.  While there is some very limited statutory protection 
for consumers,7 the current way of analyzing choice-of-law and forum 
selection clauses is deficient.  The most common way courts analyze 
choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses is by the approach set forth 
in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which assumes the 
validity of the clause as a matter of contract law.8  Courts spend little, 
if any, time on determining whether the clause in and of itself is valid 
outside of the conflict of laws analysis. 
The Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws did not give much 
deference to the parties’ choice of law or choice of forum,9 but the 
Restatement (Second) formally adopted the “party autonomy” doc-
trine.10  Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) states generally that 
“[t]he law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contrac-
tual rights and duties will be applied . . . .”11  A court should only in-
validate a choice-of-law clause if the clause has “no substantial rela-
tionship to the parties or the transaction” and there is “no other 
reasonable basis for the parties’ choice,”12 or application of the cho-
sen law would be “contrary to a fundamental policy of [the forum] 
contained a statute of repose that would not have been applicable in an American 
court). 
 4 Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 
553, 559 (1989). 
 5 The practice of giving deference to the parties’ contractual choice-of-law or fo-
rum selection clause is known as the party autonomy doctrine, discussed infra Part 
II.B. 
 6 See William J. Woodward, Jr., Constraining Opt-Outs: Shielding Local Law and 
Those It Protects from Adhesive Choice of Law Clauses, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 9, 64 (2006). 
 7 See U.C.C. § 1-301 (2003) (giving a very narrowly defined class of consumers 
some protection from choice-of-law clauses).  But see Woodward, supra note 6, at 65–
66 (stating that “consumer” is under-inclusive and that only one state has enacted 
legislation restricting choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses as used against con-
sumers). 
 8 See infra notes 154–57 and accompanying text. 
 9 Mathias Reimann, Savigny’s Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the Close 
of the Twentieth Century, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 571, 575 (1999). 
 10 Id. at 576. 
 11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) (1971). 
 12 Id. § 187(2)(a). 
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state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state.”13  
In addition, the forum state’s law must be the law that would be ap-
plicable absent the choice-of-law clause.14  The “substantial relation-
ship” test is easily met and does not pose any real threat to the par-
ties’ choice-of-law decision.15  Therefore, to invalidate the clause, the 
forum court must find four things: (1) the chosen law has neither a 
“substantial relationship” to the parties nor some other reasonable 
basis; (2) application of the choice-of-law clause would be in contra-
vention to the forum state’s fundamental policy; (3) the forum state’s 
fundamental policy is materially greater than the policy of the state 
chosen; and (4) the forum state’s law would govern absent the choice 
by the parties.16  These obstacles make it extremely difficult to invali-
date a choice-of-law or forum selection clause. 
Another major problem with the current conflicts analysis is that 
courts often presume that a valid contract exists when applying these 
conflict of laws principles.17  Courts thus gloss over the important ini-
tial question of whether the terms of the contract constitute a valid 
enforceable agreement.18 
This Comment describes and analyzes the effect of the current 
system on the weaker party to adhesion contracts.  First, this Com-
ment describes the historical background to the problem, briefly ad-
dressing the emergence of the current American conflict of laws sys-
tem, the rise of party autonomy and its relationship with pre-dispute 
forum shopping, and the contemporaneous rise of the doctrine of 
unconscionability.  In Part II, this Comment describes the current 
method courts use when analyzing the validity of choice-of-law claus-
es.  Finally, in Part III, this Comment analyzes the proper application 
of section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, using 
both case law and scholarly interpretation, and concludes that be-
cause of the deficiency of section 187, a new analysis should be used.  
Specifically, this Comment proposes a new Restatement provision re-
quiring courts to initially examine the choice-of-law or forum selec-
tion clause as a contractual matter, using the doctrine of unconscion-
ability, to determine in the first instance if the clause is enforceable 
before embarking on the complicated conflicts analysis.  This Com-
ment notes that the forum court should apply its own law to this anal-
 13 Id. § 187(2)(b). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Woodward, supra note 6, at 27. 
 16 Id. at 25–26. 
 17 See id. at 16–17. 
 18 See id. 
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ysis, but it only has the power to do so if the forum bears a “substan-
tial relationship” to the parties or the transaction.  This proposition 
will better protect consumers, individuals, and small business owners, 
while limiting the power of large companies to engage in detrimental 
pre-dispute forum shopping. 
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
A. Emergence of the Current American Conflict of Laws Doctrine 
Prior to the emergence of the current American conflict of laws 
doctrine, the law governing contract disputes was simply the law of 
the jurisdiction where the parties brought the suit.19  Because courts 
were willing to apply the law of their own forum, parties could choose 
to file in a jurisdiction whose law was favorable to them.  Scholars ar-
gued that a conflict of laws regime was necessary to guard against this 
rampant pre-dispute forum shopping, and indeed, the “very purpose 
of the classical conflicts system was the prevention of forum shop-
ping.”20  In order to avoid this problem, courts would need to apply 
the same substantive law after applying the applicable rule from the 
conflicts doctrine.21 
Conflict of laws rules are not a form of transcendent interna-
tional or interstate rules, and therefore they are primarily exercised 
through state law.22  Conflict of laws issues arise both when there is a 
conflict between an American law and a foreign law in international 
transactions and when states within the United States have conflicting 
laws.23  Because states have the power to adopt the rules that they like 
and ignore those they disfavor, there is no uniformity in the conflict 
rules adopted, and the goal of preventing forum shopping is 
thwarted.24  In addition, “there is no mechanism of superior authority 
for the resolution of ‘conflicts;’ instead, the accommodation of con-
flicting reasons for the application of local or foreign law . . . must be 
worked out and provided by the forum itself according to its own view 
of conflict of laws.”25 
 19 William J. Woodward, Finding the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum and Arbitra-
tion, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 8 (2006). 
 20 Juenger, supra note 4, at 559. 
 21 Woodward, supra note 19, at 8. 
 22 EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1–2 (2d ed. 1992). 
 23 Id. at 2. 
 24 Woodward, supra note 19, at 8–9. 
 25 SCOLES & HAY, supra note 22, at 2. 
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B. Emergence of the Party Autonomy Doctrine 
Courts generally enforced choice-of-law and choice-of-forum 
clauses as early as the nineteenth century, due to basic contract prin-
ciples that allowed parties to bargain freely for their terms, so long as 
public policy was not violated.26  In addition, many courts recognized 
ideas of comity, by which one court would be courteous to a sister 
state (domestic or international) by applying the law of that sister 
state.27  With the emergence of the conflict of laws doctrine came the 
doctrine of party autonomy, which places emphasis on the power of 
“contracting parties [to] choose the substantive law to be applied by 
[the court] deciding the parties’ rights and duties under the contract 
and resolving disputes between the parties.”28  This doctrine is closely 
tied to the contractual notion that because contracts are entered into 
deliberately, the parties’ expectations should be upheld.29  “[B]y giv-
ing effect to the parties’ own choice of the applicable law (party au-
tonomy),” not only are the parties’ expectations upheld, but predict-
ability is served as well.30  Despite the courts’ willingness to embrace 
the party autonomy doctrine, many scholars were initially (and some 
continue to be) hostile to the idea.31  For example, Joseph Beale, the 
chief architect of the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws, rejected 
the idea of party autonomy because he believed that the law regard-
ing contract disputes was not for private citizens to decide, as it was 
the province of state sovereignty.32  Not surprisingly, the first Re-
statement did not recognize party autonomy.33  In 1952, the Uniform 
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) recognized party autonomy by stating 
that “[w]henever a . . . transaction bears a reasonable relationship to 
one or more states or nations in addition to this state the parties may 
agree that the law of any such state or nation shall govern their rights 
and duties.”34 
 26 Reimann, supra note 9, at 575. 
 27 SCOLES & HAY, supra note 22, at 11–12. 
 28 Jack M. Graves, Party Autonomy in Choice of Commercial Law: The Failure of Revised 
U.C.C. § 1-301 and a Proposal for Broader Reform, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 59, 60 (2005). 
 29 SCOLES & HAY, supra note 22, at 657. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Reimann, supra note 9, at 575. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 U.C.C. § 1-105(6) (1952). 
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1. Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws 
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws fol-
lowed suit in 1971 with the enactment of section 187, which acknowl-
edges and arguably embraces party autonomy.  Section 187(1) de-
clares that “[t]he law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their 
contractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is 
one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in 
their agreement directed to that issue.”35  Section 187(2) limits the 
general acceptance of the parties’ freedom to choose the applicable 
law by stating that even if the parties could not have resolved the issue 
by an explicit provision, the clause will be upheld unless either (a) 
the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the 
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’ 
choice or (b) application of the law of the chosen state would be con-
trary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater 
interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular 
issue and which, under the rule of section 188, would be the state of 
the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the 
parties.36  A majority of the states have adopted section 187.37 
In theory, section 187(2)(a) can protect weaker parties who pre-
sumably signed an adhesion contract by requiring that the choice-of-
law or choice-of-forum clause has a “substantial relationship” to the 
parties or a reasonable basis for the parties’ choice.  Courts have gen-
erally interpreted “substantial relationship” as including any state to 
which either of the parties (or the transaction) has a substantial rela-
tionship, including the drafter’s home jurisdiction.38  Stated differ-
ently, “the parties may select the law of the state which is the domicile 
of one of them [or] either the place of formation or of perform-
ance.”39  Although courts generally refused to characterize a com-
pany’s place of incorporation as its “domicile” for these purposes 
prior to the enactment of the Restatement (Second),40 the trend to-
ward party autonomy after the Restatement (Second) seems to sug-
 35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) (1971). 
 36 Id. § 187(2). 
 37 See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restate-
ment: A Mixed Blessing, 56 MD. L. REV. 1248, 1260 & n.96 (1997). 
 38 Woodward, supra note 6, at 27. 
 39 SCOLES & HAY, supra note 22, at 671. 
 40 Id. at 672 (stating that the “state of incorporation is usually considered to have 
too indirect a connection with the transaction to support the choice of its law”). 
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gest otherwise.41  In fact, California courts have stated outright that 
the place of incorporation is “sufficient to support a finding of ‘sub-
stantial relationship.’”42 
Allowing a corporation to meet the “substantial relationship” test 
by picking its place of incorporation can have the effect of binding 
the weaker party to the laws of a state that the weaker party may never 
have contemplated governing the transaction.43  A weaker party is 
likely on notice that there may be a “substantial relationship” to the 
state of formation or the state of performance.  Under the current 
analysis, however, if the stronger party is a corporation, the weaker 
party may be bound to the law of the company’s state of incorpora-
tion, and most likely the weaker party is not on notice that the state of 
incorporation could constitute a “substantial relationship.”  Still, some 
critics of limitations on party autonomy argue that the “substantial re-
lationship” requirement is overbroad because the public policy limi-
tation44 alone is sufficient to protect the parties.45  In response to this 
argument, scholars have pointed out that the public policy limitation 
applies only to “fundamental” policies and would thus alleviate less 
abuse than the “substantial relationship” requirement, which is easily 
met anyway.46 
The forum state also retains the right to override the parties’ 
choice-of-law or forum selection clause if the fundamental policy of 
the forum is violated.47  However, for this to be rightfully exercised, 
the forum state must have a “materially greater interest” than the 
state chosen by the parties and must be the state whose law would ap-
ply absent the clause in the contract.48 
In light of section 187(2)(a) and (b), which purportedly limit 
the broad acceptance of party autonomy, it is not hard for the 
stronger party to meet the “substantial relationship” test.  The “mate-
rially greater interest” requirement and the requirement that the fo-
rum state’s law must apply absent the choice-of-law clause, however, 
 41 Woodward, supra note 6, at 27 (stating that the corporation’s home jurisdiction 
will “obviously overcome a challenge under the substantial relationship test because 
one of the contracting parties is located or incorporated in the selected state”). 
 42 See Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 84 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1998). 
 43 See id. 
 44 The fundamental public policy limitation is part of the third prong of the anal-
ysis.  See infra notes 158–63and accompanying text. 
 45 SCOLES & HAY, supra note 22, at 670. 
 46 Id. 
 47 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971). 
 48 Id. 
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are hard to meet.  Therefore, the effect of section 187 is a sweeping 
endorsement of the party autonomy principle. 
Comment b to section 187 states that a choice-of-law provision 
will not be enforced if it 
was obtained by improper means, such as by misrepresentation, 
duress, or undue influence, or by mistake . . . .  A factor which the 
forum may consider is whether the choice-of-law provision is con-
tained in an “adhesion” contract, namely one that is drafted uni-
laterally by the dominant party and then presented on a “take-it-
or-leave-it” basis to the weaker party who has no real opportunity 
to bargain about its terms.49 
Comment b illustrates the drafters’ intent to consider basic contract 
principles, specifically whether an agreement existed in the first 
place, when determining if a choice-of-law clause is enforceable.  Fur-
ther, it is likely that the “factor which the forum may consider” is un-
conscionability, but the drafters curiously declined to specifically use 
that language.  By leaving out unconscionability, comment b does not 
name all the contract law devices for analyzing the validity of an 
agreement.  Comment b is therefore insufficient in drawing courts’ 
attention to the initial question of whether a valid contract exists.  
Not surprisingly, no court has stricken a choice-of-law clause by claim-
ing that it is unconscionable pursuant to comment b.50 
When a party challenges a choice-of-law clause, in order to cor-
rectly apply section 187, the court must also understand and apply 
section 188.51  Section 188 generally addresses which law governs the 
contract in dispute in absence of the parties’ chosen law.  Section 
188(1) says that the state which “has the most significant relationship 
to the transaction and the parties” is the state whose law will govern 
the contract.52  Subsection 2 of section 188 lists certain factors to de-
termine which state has the “most significant relationship.”53 
 49 Id. § 187 cmt. b. 
 50 Woodward, supra note 6, at 54.  Professor Woodward argues that if courts 
threw out the choice-of-law clause on an initial contract challenge then the conflict 
of laws analysis would not be necessary.  Id.  This implies that section 187 would not 
have been implicated in the first place because it is a conflicts of law principle.  Id.  
This argument further supports the theory that courts assume that a valid contract 
exists for purposes of section 187.  Id. 
 51 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971). 
 52 Id. § 188. 
 53 Id. § 188(2) (listing the factors to include “(a) the place of contracting, (b) the 
place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of performance, (d) the location 
of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicile, residence, nationality, 
place of incorporation and place of business of the parties”). 
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Going even further than the Restatement (Second), the current 
U.C.C. provision addressing party autonomy requires only a “reason-
able relation” to the state chosen by the parties if the clause is in a 
consumer contract.54  The obvious purpose behind this revision is to 
expand the use of choice-of-law clauses, yet as of 2005 each of the 
twenty-one states considering adopting the new revised Article 1 of 
the U.C.C. refused to adopt the expanded party autonomy provision 
in its proposed form.55  Even though it seems that states are initially 
hesitant to further expand party autonomy, U.C.C. section 1-301 evi-
dences scholars’ preference for such an expansion. 
2. Party Autonomy and Forum Shopping 
Although some scholars believe that the purpose of creating a 
conflict of laws regime was to prevent pre-dispute forum shopping,56 
others believe that fostering competition among the states is the best 
way to ensure an efficient legal system.57  Larry Ribstein states that 
[p]ermitting contracting parties to choose their governing law 
gives states an incentive to compete for law business by providing 
efficient legal rules.  Competition works both by encouraging 
states to develop new terms to attract new legal business, and by 
encouraging states to retain legal business by efficiently revising 
their laws.58 
While Professor Ribstein’s economic-laden theory makes sense in 
some situations,59 it fails as a general rule because it does not afford 
weaker parties to contracts the proper protection.  Further, Professor 
Ribstein argues that section 187 affords the parties to a contract too 
much protection, in contravention of the party autonomy doctrine.60  
 54 U.C.C. § 1-301 (2004).  Section 1-301(c) states generally that “an agreement by 
parties to a domestic transaction that any or all of their rights and obligations are to 
be determined by the law of this State or of another State is effective, whether or not 
the transaction bears a relation to the State designated.”  Id. § 1-301(c).  However, 
section 1-301(e) states that “[i]f one of the parties to a transaction is a consumer . . . 
[a]n agreement referred to in subsection (c) is not effective unless the transaction 
bears a reasonable relation to the State or country designated.”  Id. § 1-301(e). 
 55 Graves, supra note 28, at 59, 67. 
 56 Juenger, supra note 4, at 559. 
 57 See Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 249–55 
(1993). 
 58 Id. at 249–50. 
 59 For example, Professor Ribstein’s theory makes sense when the parties to the 
contract were of equal bargaining power at the time the contract was formed. 
 60 Erin O’Hara & Larry Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law 38–39 
(George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 00-04, 2000), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=199849. 
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This Comment, however, shows the egregious effects of section 187 
and why it does not afford enough protection.61 
The party autonomy doctrine is widely embraced in Europe as 
well.62  The conflict of laws rules that govern European conflicts of 
contractual choices of law were developed at the Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, better known as the 
“Rome Convention.”63  Although the Rome Convention largely en-
dorses the notion of party autonomy in Article 3, thus giving much 
deference to the parties’ choice of law to govern the contract, there 
are some built-in protections.64  In particular, Article 5 specifically 
addresses consumer contract
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3, a choice of 
law made by the parties shall not have the result of depriv-
ing the consumer of the protection afforded to him by the 
mandatory rules of the law of the country in which he has 
his habitual residence:  
     — if in that country the conclusion of the contract was 
preceded by a specific invitation addressed to him or by ad-
vertising, and he had taken in that country all the steps ne-
cessary on his part for the conclusion of the contract, or  
     — if the other party or his agent received the consumer’s 
order in that country, or  
     — if the contract is for the sale of goods and the con-
sumer travelled from that country to another country and 
there gave his order, provided that the consumer’s journey 
was arranged by the seller for the purpose of inducing the 
consumer to buy. 
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 4, a contract to 
which this Article applies shall, in the absence of choice in 
accordance with Article 3, be governed by the law of the 
country in which the consumer has his habitual residence if 
it is entered into in the circumstances described in para-
graph 2 of this Article.65 
While some states have adopted legislation protecting consumers in 
the United States,66 the Rome Convention is superior in its protection 
 61 See infra Part II.E. 
 62 See Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations art. 3, 
June 19, 1980, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1492 [hereinafter Rome Convention]. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at art. 5. 
 66 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1751 (West 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3511 
(2007); N.J. STAT. ANN § 56:12 (West 2007). 
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of consumers because the very document that allows party autonomy 
also restricts it to avoid unfair results to consumers.67 
Although the notion of party autonomy gives great deference to 
the choice of the parties involved, it seems hostile to the doctrine of 
unconscionability because unconscionability calls for greater scrutiny 
of certain terms of a contract and for the striking down of contracts 
that shock the conscience.68  Courts seem to favor the party autonomy 
doctrine69 but do not seem as comfortable using unconscionability to 
police parties’ choices.70 
C. Forum Selection Clauses 
Section 80 of the Restatement (Second) governs the parties’ 
right to choose a forum in a contract.71  Section 80 states that “[t]he 
parties’ agreement as to the place of the action cannot oust a state of 
judicial jurisdiction, but such an agreement will be given effect unless 
it is unfair or unreasonable.”72  The “unfair or unreasonable” test is 
extremely flexible, and the analysis for whether the forum selection 
clause is binding as a matter of contract law is rather circular because 
“courts assume that customers freely contract for a particular forum 
and then use that assumption to add makeweight to the conclusion 
that the choice of forum provision is not ‘unfair or unreasonable.’”73 
In light of the Supreme Court of the United States upholding a 
seemingly unconscionable forum selection clause in Carnival Cruise 
Lines, Inc. v. Shute,74 there has been much criticism of the party au-
tonomy doctrine as applied to forum selection clauses.75  In Shute, the 
Supreme Court upheld a choice-of-forum clause on a Carnival Cruise 
Line ticket.76  The clause required the plaintiff to bring her personal 
injury claim in Florida where the offices of Carnival Cruise Lines were 
located, despite the fact that the plaintiff lived in California, which 
 67 Rome Convention, supra note 62, at art. 5. 
 68 See infra Part II.D. 
 69 See Symeonides, supra note 37, at 1260. 
 70 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 302 (4th ed. 2004) (stating that “[o]n the 
whole, judges have been cautious in applying the doctrine of unconscionability, rec-
ognizing that the parties often must make their contract quickly, that their bargain-
ing power will rarely be equal, and that courts are ill-equipped to deal with problems 
of unequal distribution of wealth in society”). 
 71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Woodward, supra note 6, at 35. 
 74 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
 75 See, e.g., Woodward, supra note 6, at 33–34. 
 76 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 499 U.S. at 595. 
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was also where the cruise took place.77  Although the plaintiff in Shute 
argued that the provision was “unfair or unreasonable,” the Court was 
not persuaded.78  While Shute was technically an admiralty case,79 it 
evidences a general endorsement of deference by the Supreme Court 
to contractually selected forums. 
In America Online v. Booker,80 a Florida court applied Shute to 
achieve what some claim is an even harsher outcome than Shute it-
self.81  There, the court’s enforcement of the choice-of-forum clause 
effectively destroyed the plaintiff’s claim because Virginia, the chosen 
forum, had no class-action procedure.82  The suit would likely be a 
“negative value suit” without class certification,83 so the claims were in 
effect barred.84  The court found that the plaintiff’s claims did not 
meet the standard of showing that the forum selection clause was 
“unreasonable or unjust.”85  If the trend set by Shute and Booker con-
tinues, the Second Restatement’s purported protection of disallowing 
choice-of-forum clauses that are “unfair or unreasonable” is essen-
tially useless. 
D. Emergence of the Doctrine of Unconscionability 
In 1941, the American Law Institute circulated a draft of the 
U.C.C. that contained the precursor to section 2-302, expressly rec-
ognizing the equitable doctrine of unconscionability.86  The final ver-
sion of the first U.C.C. contained the following language: 
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of 
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made 
the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce 
the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 588–89, 595. 
 79 Woodward, supra note 19, at 16 (noting that “[i]t is reasonably clear that be-
cause Carnival Cruise Lines was an admiralty case, its analysis need not be adopted by 
state courts deciding whether they should dismiss a case where an adhesion contract 
specifies a different exclusive forum”). 
 80 781 So. 2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
 81 Woodward, supra note 6, at 34. 
 82 America Online, 781 So. 2d at 424. 
 83 See In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 411 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004) (stat-
ing that a “‘negative value’ suit is one in which class members’ claims ‘would be un-
economical to litigate individually’” (quoting Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 
797, 809 (1985))). 
 84 America Online, 781 So. 2d at 424–25. 
 85 Id. at 425. 
 86 Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 
U. PA. L. REV. 485, 489 (1967). 
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or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as 
to avoid any unconscionable result.87 
This section has remained largely unchanged, except that the word 
“term” now replaces the word “clause.”88  Comment one to the cur-
rent version states that “[t]his section makes it possible for a court to 
police explicitly against the contracts or terms which the court finds 
to be unconscionable instead of attempting to achieve the result by 
an adverse construction of language . . . or by a determination that 
the term is contrary to public policy . . . .”89  This language contradicts 
section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws be-
cause it challenges courts to find terms unconscionable in and of 
themselves without looking to contravention of public policy, as sec-
tion 187 requires, to invalidate a choice-of-law clause.90 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts followed suit by enact-
ing section 208, which contains similar language to the U.C.C. provi-
sion.  Section 208 states: 
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the 
contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or 
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the uncon-
scionable term, or may so limit the application of any uncon-
scionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.91 
Despite such broad language, courts generally require a showing that 
the clause or term is both procedurally and substantively unconscion-
able.92  To determine whether the procedural unconscionability 
prong has been met, courts look to such factors as “bargaining prac-
tices . . . the use of fine print and convoluted language . . . [and] a 
lack of understanding.”93  Substantive unconscionability is found 
when the contract contains “unreasonably favorable terms” for one of 
the parties, focusing on the content of the contract, not the bargain-
ing process by which it was reached.94  However, courts commonly 
view these requirements as a “sliding scale,” meaning that if “more of 
one is present then less of the other is required.”95 
 87 U.C.C. § 2-302 (1952). 
 88 U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2003). 
 89 Id. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2003). 
 90 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971). 
 91 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). 
 92 FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, at 301. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 302; see also Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1280–82 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (describing California’s unconscionability doctrine, which uses a sliding 
scale analysis). 
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E. Current State of Courts’ Application of Section 187 
1. Confusion Applying Section 187 
Although a majority of the states have adopted section 187 of the 
Restatement (Second),96 some courts seem to be confused about its 
application.  In Nedlloyd Lines B.C. v. Superior Court,97 the Supreme 
Court of California described its process for determining whether a 
choice-of-law clause should be applied under a section 187 analysis.98  
Nedlloyd involved a shipping company incorporated in Hong Kong 
that contracted with other shipping companies incorporated in the 
Netherlands.99  The defendant companies had their principal places 
of business in the Netherlands, while the plaintiff company had its 
principal place of business in California.100  The court ultimately 
found that the choice-of-law clause—calling for application of Hong 
Kong law—was enforceable because Hong Kong had a “substantial 
connection with the parties.”101  In reaching this conclusion, the court 
explained the section 187 test that California courts should use.102  Af-
ter directly quoting section 187,103 the court articulated what it 
thought to be the proper application of section 187(2): 
The court [must] first . . . determine either: (1) whether the cho-
sen state has a substantial relationship to the parties or their 
transaction, or (2) whether there is any other reasonable basis for 
the parties’ choice of law.  If neither of these tests is met, that is 
the end of the inquiry, and the court need not enforce the par-
ties’ choice of law.  If, however, either test is met, the court must 
next determine whether the chosen state’s law is contrary to a 
fundamental policy of California.  If there is no such conflict, the 
court shall enforce the parties’ choice of law.  If, however, there is 
a fundamental conflict with California law, the court must then 
determine whether California has a “materially greater interest 
than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue 
. . . .”  If California has a materially greater interest than the cho-
sen state, the choice of law shall not be enforced, for the obvious 
 96 Symeonides, supra note 37, at 1260 & n.96. 
 97 834 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1992). 
 98 Id. at 1151–52. 
 99 Id. at 1149–50. 
 100 Id. at 1149. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 1151–52. 
 103 Nedlloyd Lines B.C., 834 P.2d. at 1151. 
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reason that in such circumstance we will decline to enforce a law 
contrary to this state’s fundamental policy.104 
This explanation, however, deviated from the plain language of sec-
tion 187.  The Supreme Court of California’s interpretation is inher-
ently flawed because it fails to recognize one of the explicit require-
ments of section 187: section 187 clearly indicates that a court can 
only invalidate a choice-of-law provision and apply its own law—due 
to contravention of the forum state’s fundamental policy—if the fo-
rum state “would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an 
effective choice of law by the parties.”105 
In Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., a California ap-
peals court applied the test set forth in Nedlloyd to determine whether 
the parties’ choice-of-law clause was binding.106  There, a California 
corporation hired an employee who had previously signed a contract 
containing a covenant not to compete and a Maryland choice-of-law 
clause with a Maryland corporation, her previous employer.107  Al-
though the court found other reasons for not enforcing the covenant 
not to compete,108 much of the analysis relied on California’s applica-
tion of section 187 to the conflict of laws question at hand.109  The 
court concluded that although Maryland bears a “substantial relation-
ship” to the parties, and there clearly is a “reasonable basis” for the 
parties choosing Maryland law as the applicable law, the fundamental 
policy of California requires a court to render non-compete clauses 
void.110  The court then noted that the laws of California and Mary-
land are “diametrically opposed” regarding non-compete clauses,111 
but nonetheless found that California’s interest was materially great-
er.112  Completely lacking in this analysis, however, is any mention of 
whose law would apply absent the choice-of-law clause.113 
 104 Id. at 1152 (internal footnotes and citations omitted). 
 105 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971) (emphasis 
added). 
 106 Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 82–88 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1998). 
 107 Id. at 76–77. 
 108 See id. at 81 (noting that the covenant not to compete was limited to one year, 
and because that year had passed, the argument for enforcement was essentially 
moot). 
 109 Id. at 82–83 (citing Nedlloyd Lines B.C., 834 P.2d at 1150–52) (relying heavily on 
Nedlloyd and quoting significant portions of that decision). 
 110 Id. at 84–86. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Application Group, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86. 
 113 See id. at 84–86. 
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New Jersey is seemingly joining California’s approach by placing 
much importance on the contravention of its fundamental policy but 
not determining whether New Jersey law would apply absent the par-
ties’ choice-of-law clause.  For example, in North Bergen Rex Transport, 
Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co., the Supreme Court of New Jersey applied 
New Jersey law to a dispute regarding attorneys’ fees, despite the par-
ties’ specification that Illinois law would govern the contract.114  The 
court did not discuss whether New Jersey law would have applied in 
the absence of the choice-of-law clause.115 
2. Egregiously Unfair Results 
Despite misapplication of section 187, which clearly shows that 
some of the protections envisioned by the drafters are essentially 
moot,116 a more extreme problem occurs when courts faithfully apply 
section 187 but reach an egregiously unfair result.  In Scheifley v. Dis-
cover Bank, a federal court in Washington upheld a choice-of-law 
clause specifying Delaware’s law as controlling.117  Plaintiff Scheifley 
sought to bring the suit as a class-action against the bank for violating 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act.118  The contract included an arbitra-
tion clause and a class-action waiver, and Scheifley claimed that the 
arbitration clause was unconscionable due to the embedded class-
action waiver.119  However, the court found the choice-of-law clause 
binding, which effectively “decided the entire
Class-action waivers in Delaware do not render arbitration claus-
es unconscionable, but Washington precedent dictated that arbitra-
tion clauses embedded in class-action waivers would be unconscion-
able.121  Scheifley was effectively barred from bringing a class-action 
suit against the bank, and because the suit is likely considered a “neg-
ative value suit,” she may never get relief.  An individual plaintiff is 
 114 N. Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co., 730 A.2d 843, 847–48 (N.J. 
1999). 
 115 See id. 
 116 Presumably, the drafters of section 187 thought that by requiring a forum to 
find that its own law would only apply “in the absence of an effective choice of law by 
the parties,” the drafters were stopping courts from applying their own law on the 
mere basis that the forum has a “materially greater interest” than the chosen state.  
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b). 
 117 Order, Scheifley v. Discover Bank, No. CV 03-2801 RBL (W.D. Wash. June 25, 
2004); see also Woodward, supra note 6, at 28–29 (discussing Scheifley in depth). 
 118 Order, Scheifley v. Discover Bank, No. CV 03-2801 RBL (W.D. Wash. June 25, 
2004). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
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likely to forego the right to arbitrate if it would cost more to do so 
than the plaintiff would receive in damages, especially if the arbitra-
tion must take place in a state to which the plaintiff would have to 
travel. 
More recently in a factually similar circumstance, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a Virginia 
choice-of-law clause in a consumer contract in Gay v. CreditInform.122  
The contract included both an arbitration clause and a class action 
waiver, which under Virginia law are valid within arbitration.123  The 
court refused to find the arbitration clause itself unconscionable un-
der the Federal Arbitration Act, and therefore the plaintiff was 
barred from bringing a class-action.124  If it will cost the plaintiff more 
to litigate the case than she will recover, then she will not bring the 
suit and will not get relief. 
Another example of a seemingly unfair result from upholding a 
choice-of-law clause is Nexen Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Engineering Co.125  In 
1991,126 Gulf Interstate Engineering Co. (GIE) agreed by contract to 
contribute certain engineering services to Nexen Inc.127 for a project 
in Yemen.128  When flooding caused damage to a pipeline at the pro-
ject site, Nexen sued GIE for “breach of contract, breach of warranty, 
negligence, and strict liability for design defect.”129  GIE moved for 
summary judgment, arguing that the contract contained an Alberta, 
Canada choice-of-law clause.130  Under Alberta law, the ten-year stat-
ute of repose would bar any claims because the date of completion 
was 1993.131  The court recognized that application of Texas law 
would allow the plaintiffs to still bring claims because the Texas stat-
ute of limitations only applied to specific parties and has a different 
accrual date than Alberta law.132  However, the court applied Alberta 
 122 511 F.3d 369, 390 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 123 See id. at 391–92. 
 124 See id. at 394. 
 125 224 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006). 
 126 The contract was also amended in 1992, to extend the time period for the per-
formance of the contract.  Id. at 414. 
 127 The original party to the contract was Nexen’s corporate predecessor, Cana-
dianOxy Offshore International Ltd., but the contracting party at issue will be re-
ferred to as Nexen.  Id. at 414–15. 
 128 Id. at 414. 
 129 Id. at 415. 
 130 Id. at 415–16 (stating that generally applicable Alberta law imposes a statute of 
repose that starts accruing from the date of completion of the contract; the law ap-
plies regardless of subsequent events, and regardless of the party bringing the claim). 
 131 Nexen Inc., 224 S.W.3d at 415–16. 
 132 Id. at 419–22. 
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law, thus dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims and effectively denying them 
any relief.133  The court heavily relied on a central tenet of contract 
law, stating that “[t]he most basic policy of contract law is the protec-
tion of the justified expectations of the parties.”134 
III. ANALYSIS 
The conflict of laws analysis has come to embrace the idea of 
party autonomy, thus giving deference to certain contract princi-
ples.135  By giving so much deference to the law the parties choose, 
however, the original goal of the conflicts regime, namely, to have a 
uniform law and to avoid pre-dispute forum shopping,136 is thwarted.  
Courts generally allow the parties (or, in a contract of adhesion, the 
stronger party) to choose a law that is most favorable.137  It seems, 
however, that courts are likely to presume that a valid contract existed 
in the first place and to take up a section 187 analysis without first ex-
amining basic contracts questions.138  This is most likely due to sec-
tion 187’s assumption of contractual validit
A. Using a Three-Step Analysis 
To sort through some of the confusion that courts have encoun-
tered in applying section 187, some scholars have suggested that 
courts embark on a three-step process.140 
1. Whose Contract Law Applies? 
First, “the forum court faces an initial conflict of laws question of 
which state’s contract law governs the choice-of-law or choice-of-
forum provision in the contract.”141  As Professor Woodward notes, 
this “initial question of which state’s contract law should be applied 
to determine whether the underlying contract is enforceable . . . is 
scarcely addressed anywhere.”142  In the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, courts generally used the contract law of the state where the 
contract was made for construction and interpretation of the con-
 133 Id. at 419–22, 426. 
 134 Id. at 419 (internal citations omitted). 
 135 See Graves, supra note 28, at 60. 
 136 Juenger, supra note 4, at 559. 
 137 See supra notes 117–34and accompanying text. 
 138 Woodward, supra note 6, at 17. 
 139 See id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 18 (emphasis omitted). 
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tract, called the “vested rights” theory.143  This was the position of the 
Restatement (First).144  The “vested rights” approach lasted until the 
“conflicts revolution.”145  The “conflicts revolution” shifted emphasis 
toward state interests and policies when states began to give more de-
ference to the choice of the parties.146  In the latter half of the twenti-
eth century, some courts began to use the “most significant relation-
ship” test, which used factors to balance state interests and policies to 
determine which jurisdiction had the most relevant connection to the 
contract.147  This is the approach adopted by the Restatement (Sec-
ond).148  Courts have not universally adopted this approach, however, 
and a circuit split exists regarding whether the contract law of the fo-
rum or the parties’ chosen state should apply.149 
Comment b to section 187 briefly addresses this issue by stating 
that a contract “obtained by improper means, such as by misrepresen-
tation, duress, or undue influence, or by mistake” is not enforceable, 
and that the existence of such improper means shall be “determined 
by the forum in accordance with its own legal principles.”150  How-
ever, this contradicts the general approach of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) because section 188 “directs a forum court to use the contract 
law of the jurisdiction with the ‘most significant relationship’ in de-
ciding most contract law questions.”151  Known as the “center of grav-
ity” approach, this method limits the parties’ power to choose the ap-
plicable contract law, because the forum court would be forced to 
apply the law of the forum with the “most significant relationship” to 
the parties or the transaction.152  Although Professor Woodward ar-
gues that applying section 188 better avoids forum shopping than 
 143 Reimann, supra note 9, at 579. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 584. 
 146 See id. 
 147 Id. at 579–81. 
 148 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971). 
 149 Compare Heating & Air Specialists, Inc. v. Jones, 180 F.3d 923, 930–31 (8th Cir. 
1999) (holding that the law of the state chosen by the parties would apply to contract 
construction only because the clause specifically denoted that the law “shall  
govern . . . interpretation,” but otherwise, the forum is free to use its own law where 
there is a significant relationship), with Kipin Indus., Inc. v. Van Deilen Int’l, Inc., 
182 F.3d 490, 493–94 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that proper application of section 
187 requires a court to apply the chosen law to contract interpretation). 
 150 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. b (1971). 
 151 Woodward, supra note 6, at 19. 
 152 Id. 
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does comment b to section 187,153 allowing a forum court to apply its 
own contract law will help avoid any unfair pre-dispute forum shop
2. Is the Provision Binding as a Matter of Contract Law? 
After determining whose contract law should apply, the second 
step in the analysis is to apply “that contract law to the choice of law 
or forum clause to determine whether the provision is binding on the 
parties as a matter of contract law.”154  Courts applying section 187 do 
not seem to analyze this portion of the inquiry thoroughly, if at all, 
because they spend most of their time discussing and applying the 
third step of the analysis.155  In addition, it seems that the contracts 
questions that courts do consider (misrepresentation, duress, undue 
influence, and mistake)156 are applicable mainly to the contract as a 
whole, and not to the choice-of-law or choice-of-forum clause.  If this 
initial contracts determination more specifically asked whether the 
contract and all of its specific terms/clauses were enforceable, it might 
force courts to look more specifically at the choice-of-law or choice-of-
forum clause and apply a doctrine such as unconscionability, which 
can be used to invalidate the contract as a whole or any of its individ-
ual terms or clauses.157  It would be more equitable and practical if 
courts looked more carefully at the validity of the clauses and terms 
in the first step by analyzing choice-of-law and forum selection clauses 
under the rubric of unconscionability, instead of
Should the Forum Court Rec
or Forum Selection Clause? 
Once the court determines that the choice-of-law or choice-of-
forum provision in question is binding as a matter of contract law, the 
court moves to the third step and asks “whether the forum court 
 153 Id. (stating that “[c]omment b to [s]ection 187 is curious because applying the 
law of the forum state to a threshold contract question opens the potential for forum 
shopping”). 
 154 Id. at 17. 
 155 Id. at 21. 
 156 These are the doctrines listed in comment b to section 187.  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. b (1971). 
 157 See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2003) (stating that if the court “finds the contract or any 
term of the contract to have been unconscionable . . . the court may refuse to enforce 
[it]” (emphasis added)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (stating 
that if “a contract or term thereof is unconscionable . . . a court may refuse to enforce 
the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscion-
able term . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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should recognize the contractual choice of law or choice of forum 
the parties collectively made or whether the forum state’s policies 
should override the parties’ agreement to the choice of law or fo-
rum.”158  This step dominates the section 187 analysis.159  At this stage, 
the court must determine (1) whether the chosen law has either a 
“substantial relationship” to the parties, or some other reasonable ba-
sis,160 (2) whether application of the choice-of-law clause would be in 
contravention of the forum state’s fundamental policy,161 (3) whether 
the forum state’s fundamental policy is materially greater than the 
policy of the state chosen,162 and (4) whether th
ection 187(2)(b) Is Insufficient as It Currently Stands 
Courts are able to give some deference to the parties’ intentions 
by allowing only the forum court to invalidate a choice-of-law clause 
(assuming that it first legitimately passes the initial contracts ques-
tion) if the effect is to violate a fundamental policy of that forum.164  
However, the additional requirements imposed by section 187—that 
the forum’s fundamental policy must be “materially greater” than the 
choice of the parties and that the forum’s law would apply absent the 
choice-of-law clause—put an almost impossible burden on the plain-
tiff when both are applied properly.  As previously discussed,165 some 
states have stopped applying the provision requiring that the forum’s 
law would apply absent the parties’ choice.  This illustrates an attempt 
by those courts to give relief to a party whose claims might otherwise 
be barred; however, to reach this result, those courts find it necessary 
to ignore the “absence choice” provision.166  Further, by getting past 
the first portion of section 187, which requires that the choice of law 
have a “substantial relationship” (or other reasonable basis) to the 
transaction or parties,167 the plaintiff carries a substantial burden to 
 158 Woodward, supra note 6, at 17. 
 159 Id. at 21. 
 160 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971). 
 161 Id. § 187(2)(b). 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 22, at 657 (stating that “predictability in choice-of-
law decisions is an important value in contracts.  Such predictability is served, and 
party expectations are protected, by giving effect to the parties’ own choice of the 
applicable law (party autonomy)”). 
 165 See supra Part II.E.1 (discussing how New Jersey and California do not use the 
“absent choice” provision). 
 166 Id. 
 167 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971). 
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show that, to the contrary, the forum state has the “most significant re-
lationship” as required by section 188 for the determination of whose 
law would apply absent the choice-of-law clause.168  In addition, states 
may be unwilling to boast that their own policy is “materially greater” 
than a sister state’s in many cases.169  With section 187(2) imposing 
such a harsh standard on the plaintiff to invalidate the contractual 
choice of law, courts must have an alternative m
The Need for Change 
While one of the purported goals of adopting a conflict of laws 
regime is to avoid forum shopping,170 the application of section 187 
actually encourages pre-dispute forum shopping in some contexts. 
For instance, the most obvious scenario involves a contract of adhe-
sion, with the stronger party providing a form contract to a weaker 
party,171 containing terms that are more beneficial to it than the other 
party.  While courts have been willing to strike down clauses that 
shock the conscience, pursuant to procedural and substantive uncon-
scionability principles,172 the party autonomy doctrine creates the no-
tion that the underlying contract (and its individual clauses) are pre-
sumptively valid and instead subjects the choice-of-law clause “to the 
complex ‘fundamental policy’ analysis found in the Second Restate-
ment of Conflict of Laws . . . [which] may give such adhesive choice-
of-law clauses a presumption of greater validity than they deserve.”173  
The stronger party—instead of directly injecting clauses favorable to 
it that might otherwise be unconscionable—can choose a forum to 
which it has some relationship174 and whose law gives the effect of the 
 168 Id. § 188(1) (1971) (requiring that the forum with the most significant rela-
tionship govern contract issues) (emphasis added); id. § 188(2) (listing factors for 
considering whether the forum is the state with the most significant relationship to 
the transaction and the parties). 
 169 See, e.g., Estee Lauder Co. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(recognizing that mere contradiction of the forum state’s law does not render a fun-
damental policy “materially greater” for purposes of section 187). 
 170 Juenger, supra note 4, at 559. 
 171 Although weaker parties are normally individuals or consumers, they can also 
be small businesses who have no real bargaining position against the larger compa-
nies with whom they contract.  Thus, it seems that the current state of the law also 
harms small businesses.  See Woodward, supra note 6, at 64–69. 
 172 FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, at 301–02. 
 173 Woodward, supra note 6, at 51. 
 174 Although section 187 requires a “substantial relationship,” courts have inter-
preted that clause very broadly so that the word “substantial” becomes useless.  See 
SCOLES & HAY, supra note 22, at 670. 
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favorable provision.  The weaker party is not likely to realize the ef-
fect of the choice-of-law clause on its face, and will therefore be 
bound to terms of which the party had no knowledge.  Essentially, the 
stronger party has great opportunity for
ugh use of choice-of-law provisions. 
Two of the most concrete examples of the egregious effects of 
section 187 are Scheifley v. Discover Bank175 and Nexen Inc. v. Gulf Inter-
state Engineering Co.,176 which are both discussed in Part II.E.2.  Essen-
tially, the plaintiffs in both cases were barred from 
to the enforcement of the choice-of-law clause.177 
Additionally, there are numerous hypothetical examples that il-
lustrate the egregious effects of section 187 especially those involving 
class-action waivers.  For example, if a large company that is incorpo-
rated in Delaware178 provides goods or services to consumers in Geor-
gia and gets such consumers to sign adhesion contracts, the contract 
may include a Delaware choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clause, 
even if the company’s principal place of business and most of its con-
sumers are in Georgia.179  If the contract also contains an arbitration 
clause with an embedded class-action waiver, then a harmed con-
sumer may have no access to relief.  In Delaware, class-action waivers 
are enforceable,180 whereas the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit, applying Georgia law, recently ruled that arbitration 
clauses with hidden class-action waivers are unconscionable.181  If the 
consumer attempts to bring a class-action against the corporation in 
Georgia, her home state, where all of the transactions have occurred 
and where the company maintains its principal place of business, 
then the choice-of-law clause, with all the weight given to it by section 
187, will require Georgia to apply Delaware law.  The court’s atten-
tion will be drawn directly to the choice-of-law clause, which gives 
presumptive validity to contractual issues, instead of focusing on the 
unconscionability of the arbitration clause with the embedded class-
 175 Order, Scheifley v. Discover Bank, No. CV 03-2801 RBL (W.D. Wash. June 25, 
2004). 
 176 224 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. App. 2006). 
 177 See supra Part II.E.2. 
 178 Most large publicly traded companies are incorporated in Delaware.  Division 
of Corporations, About Agency, State of Delaware Official Website, http://www. 
corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Sept. 19, 2008). 
 179 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing how a state of incorporation is sufficient to 
meet the “substantial relationship” test in section 187). 
 180 See Order, Scheifley v. Discover Bank, No. CV 03-2801 RBL (W.D. Wash. June 
25, 2004). 
 181 Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting, however, 
that the question of unconscionability is to be determined on a case by case basis). 
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policy of a sister state, which courts are hesi-
tant 
claims 
would be forever barred by the hidden statute of limitations.185 
D. 
 
action waiver.  The court would have to conclude that non-
enforcement of unconscionable terms is a fundamental policy of 
Georgia, which is materially greater than the policy of enforcing 
(purportedly) negotiated terms of a contract,182 and that Georgia law 
would apply absent the Delaware choice-of-law clause.  Most likely, 
the court will uphold the choice-of-law clause because it is not 
enough that a fundamental policy of the forum is thwarted.183  The 
court must also find that its fundamental policy is materially greater 
than the fundamental 
to find.184 
Another example of an egregious effect is allowing a stronger 
party to an adhesion contract to choose the law of a state that has 
shorter statute of limitations periods for relevant causes of action.  By 
merely agreeing to a choice of law by signing the form contract, the 
weaker party is not likely to realize that all potential claims may be 
barred by enforcement of the parties’ choice due to a shorter statute 
of limitations period than the weaker party’s state, which is most like-
ly to be the place in which most of the transactions occurred.  The 
trend is for states to uphold a choice-of-law clause, even if the 
Proposed Solutions 
The current method for evaluating choice-of-law and choice-of-
forum clauses is deficient.186  While contract law tries to strike a bal-
ance between the freedom to contract and basic notions of fairness,187 
the stronger party to adhesion contracts can use the conflict of laws 
system, specifically section 187, to avoid some of the fairness protec-
tion that contract law affords.  This Comment proposes a new Re-
statement provision which focuses on the use of unconscionability for 
directly evaluating the choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses as a 
matter of contract law in the first instance.  The forum state should 
 182 For the purposes of this hypothetical, this Comment assumes that the State of 
Delaware considers this position a fundamental state policy. 
 183 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971). 
 184 See Estee Lauder Co. Inc. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(recognizing that mere contradiction of the forum state’s law does not render a fun-
damental policy “materially greater” for purposes of section 187). 
 185 See, e.g., Hambrecht & Quist Venture Partners v. Am. Med. Int’l., Inc., 46 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 33, 38–39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Formato v. Protonex Tech. Corp., No. 
050037C, 2006 WL 4114292, at *4 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Dec. 20, 2006). 
 186 See supra Parts II.B.1 and II.C. 
 187 This is evidenced by giving great power to parties to bargain for their terms, 
but limiting that power by doctrines like duress, misrepresentation, undue influence, 
and unconscionability. 
CAMAROTE (FINAL) 4/6/2009  11:20:05 PM 
2009] COMMENT 629 
te has a “substantial relationship” as de-
fined by previous case law.188 
1. 
ial 
is sufficiently related to the par-
ties o
 availing itself through transactions with resi-
dents of that state.191 
2. irectly to Choice-of-Law 
 
retain jurisdiction to decide the unconscionability issue by its own 
law, so long as the forum sta
Allowing the Forum Court to Decide the 
Unconscionability Issue if It Has a “Substant
Relationship” to the Transaction or Parties 
Presumably, the stronger party, who strong-armed the weaker 
party into an adhesion contract, chose the choice of law or choice of 
forum in the contract, knowing the chosen state has laws favorable to 
it.  To counteract this advantage, the forum court should apply its 
own unconscionability law to the choice-of-law or choice-of-forum 
clause, but only if the forum has a “substantial relationship” to the 
transaction or parties according to the state’s case law defining “sub-
stantial relationship.”  The plaintiff, especially if an individual con-
sumer, will most likely bring the action in his or her home state, 
where it is likely that the transaction or series of transactions oc-
curred.  Therefore, it is fair to let the forum use its own law for the in-
itial unconscionability question if it 
r transaction.189 
This approach seems to resemble a minimum contacts analysis, 
which is used to determine whether a defendant can be sued in a for-
eign state after having availed itself of the laws of that jurisdiction.190  
The theory would be that the defendant, although having sought to 
contract into using only the laws of a designated state, has subjected 
itself to the laws of the forum state (for our purposes, for just the ini-
tial unconscionability determination) by creating contacts with that 
state by purposefully
Applying Unconscionability D
and Forum Selection Clauses 
The current system does not encourage a court to look specifi-
cally at the choice-of-law or choice-of-forum clause in the first in-
 188 See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 22, at 671; Woodward, supra note 6, at 27. 
 189 This is similar to the analysis for why it is acceptable to let a court uphold a 
contractual choice-of-law or choice-of-forum clause because the chosen state bears a 
“substantial relationship” to the parties or transaction.  See supra Part II.B. 
 190 See Adam M. Greenfield, Reviving the Distinction Between In Rem and In Personam 
Jurisdiction by Way of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 35 AIPLA Q.J. 29, 
50 (2007). 
 191 Id. 
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rd 
step.
e are sufficient protections built into the 
doct
 
stance.  The only initial question that pertains to the law of contracts 
focuses on the fairness of the contract as a whole through the doc-
trines of misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, and mistake.192  
Courts, therefore, must utilize Professor Woodward’s three-step anal-
ysis, and not until the third step does the court decide whether the 
choice-of-law or choice-of-forum clause should be enforced.193  Once 
at this third step, the court still must determine four things: (1) 
whether the chosen law has either a “substantial relationship” to the 
parties, or some other reasonable basis,194 (2) whether application of 
the choice-of-law clause would be in contravention of the forum 
state’s fundamental policy,195 (3) whether the forum state’s funda-
mental policy is materially greater than the policy of the state cho-
sen,196 and (4) whether the forum state’s law would govern absent the 
choice by the parties.197  By the time the forum goes through the first 
two steps, it still has to consider the four requirements in the thi
  This process limits the plaintiff’s ability to choose the forum. 
By forcing the forum court to address the choice-of-law or 
choice-of-forum clause at the outset (once a substantial relationship 
has been established), the court can focus on the fairness of the situa-
tion without facing all the hurdles of the current system.198  Comment 
b to section 187 already allows a court to strike down the whole con-
tract due to misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, or mis-
take,199 but the Restatement (Second) fails to realize that uncon-
scionability is also an equitable doctrine meant to protect parties to a 
contract from unfair practices.200  For the question of unconscionabil-
ity, it would not be necessary to find that the forum court’s funda-
mental policy is “materially greater” than the law of the state chosen 
by the parties.  Removing the “materially greater” requirement would 
not substantially diminish the power of the choice-of-law or forum se-
lection clause because ther
rine of unconscionability itself. 
 192 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. b (1971). 
 193 See supra Part III.A. 
 194 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971). 
 195 Id. § 187(2)(b). 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
 198 In addition to examining the clause itself by applying the doctrine of uncon-
scionability, the court should still evaluate the contract as a whole by the doctrines of 
misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, and mistake.  See id. § 187 cmt. b. 
 199 Id. 
 200 See supra Part II.B.1. 
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lity.  It will therefore 
be u
transaction or parties.  A further protection is that the forum court 
can only hear the case in the first instance if it has proper jurisdiction 
 
The safeguards already embedded in the doctrine of uncon-
scionability will both rid the unconscionability analysis of the un-
needed “materially greater” test and ensure that the doctrine is not 
overused.  First, when an unconscionability claim is being decided, 
the party who claims that the contract or term is unconscionable 
bears the burden of proof .201  Second, most courts require a showing 
of both procedural and substantive unconscionability, thus protecting 
against a claim of unconscionability where the only objection is that 
the contract was a contract of adhesion.202  Third, many courts are re-
luctant to use the doctrine of unconscionability in standard commer-
cial transactions because it lacks a clear definition.203  These safe-
guards will protect against the overuse of the doctrine of 
unconscionability while still ensuring that plaintiffs with valid claims 
will benefit from the focused review of the choice-of-law or choice-of-
forum clause under the rubric of unconscionabi
nnecessary for the court to first determine if its law is “materially 
greater” than the law of the chosen jurisdiction. 
If the forum court finds that the choice-of-law or choice-of-
forum clause is unconscionable, then the forum court should apply 
its own law.  If the forum court finds the clause not to be uncon-
scionable, then it can proceed by looking at other contract law de-
vices such as misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, and mistake 
to see if the contract as a whole is valid, according to the law of the 
chosen state.  Once the court is satisfied that the contract is valid, it 
should ensure that the chosen state has a substantial relationship to 
the parties or transaction.  The forum court should then further in-
quire about whether the choice-of-law or choice-of-forum clause 
should apply by analyzing whether applying the law of the chosen 
state is in contravention of the forum state’s fundamental policy and 
whether that fundamental policy is materially greater than the policy 
of the chosen state.  This analysis would no longer require that the 
forum’s state law would govern absent the choice by the parties; this 
approach balances out the lax standard for determining whether a 
“substantial relationship” exists between the chosen state and the 
 201 FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, at 299. 
 202 Id. at 301. 
 203 Nicola Lucchi, The Supremacy of Techno-Governance: Privatization of Digital Content 
and Consumer Protection in the Globalized Information Society, 15 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 
192, 221–22 (2007). 
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over the defendant pursuant to the applicable rules of civil proce-
dure.204 
3. Effects of the Proposed Provision 
By allowing a forum court to apply its own law to the initial con-
tracts question of unconscionability—and assuming a substantial rela-
tionship between the forum and the transaction or parties—the court 
can help protect consumers and small business owners from the det-
rimental pre-dispute forum shopping efforts of the large company 
who supplied the adhesion contract containing the choice-of-law or 
choice-of-forum clause.  Also, by letting the forum court decide this 
initial question, the court is able to hold the defendant accountable 
in the forum of which it has availed itself.  Consumers will also be en-
couraged to bring actions in a convenient forum because travel ex-
penses (incurred by traveling to the place of litigation) are better 
born by the large company.  However, this would not be too much of 
a burden because the forum will only retain jurisdiction if the initial 
“substantial relationship” test is met, and only for the question of un-
conscionability.  Further, by forcing courts to ponder the existence of 
a valid choice-of-law or choice-of-forum clause in the first instance, 
the presumption of a valid contract205 will be thwarted.  Last, this new 
provision will eliminate confusion from the current section 187 ap-
proach. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The nearly universal acceptance of the party autonomy doctrine 
has not only adversely affected weaker parties to contracts, but it has 
also encouraged pre-dispute forum shopping.  Section 187, although 
deceptively short and seemingly clear, has caused much confusion in 
courts because it is a clash between contracts and conflict of laws 
principles.  By giving deference to the parties’ contractual choices, 
the rise of party autonomy seems to be a victory for contract law.  
However, one key doctrine has not made its way into the conflicts 
analysis from contracts law—the protective restraint on unfair 
terms—unconscionability.  If the conflict of laws regime continues to 
give great deference to parties’ contractual rights and choices, then it 
must also embrace and encourage the protection of unconscionabil-
 204 See, e.g., McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–24 (1957) (requiring 
that the defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum state before the 
forum court can exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant). 
 205 See Woodward, supra note 6, at 17 (suggesting that courts assume that an en-
forceable contract already exists when embarking on the conflicts of law analysis). 
CAMAROTE (FINAL) 4/6/2009  11:20:05 PM 
2009] COMMENT 633 
ity as directly applied to choice-of-law and forum selection clauses, 
which are increasingly used as vehicles for pre-dispute forum shop-
ping.  By forcing courts to look at the choice-of-law or forum selec-
tion clause as a threshold matter, courts will better protect weaker 
parties to contracts of adhesion and ensure the fair review of con-
tracts. 
